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In the Matter of 
ALBANY POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
" ' - . . . Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-6019 
CITY OF ALBANY, 
) 
Employer, 
- and -
ALBANY POLICE OFFICERS UNION, LOCAL 2841, 
COUNCIL 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor/lncumbent.' 
GLEASON, DUNN, WALSH AND O'SHEA (RONALD G. DUNN 
of counsel), for Petitioner 
JOHN J. REILLY, CORPORATION COUNSEL (TARA.B. WELLS 
of counsel), for Employer 
ENNIO CORSI, ESQ., for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On October 8, 2010, the Albany Police Benevolent Association (petitioner) filed, 
in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Public Employment Relations Board, 
i 1 • • • 
a timely petition seeking certification as the exclusive representative of certain 
employees of the City of Albany (employer). 
Excluded: All others. 
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was held on December 22, 
2010, at Which a majority of ballots were cast against representation' by the petitioner. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the eligible 
voters in the unit who cast ballots do not desire to be represented for the purpose of 
collective bargaining by the petitioner, IT IS ORDERED that the petition should be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: May 2, 2011 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Lefki 
Sheila S. ColeC Member 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Petitioner, • 
-and- CASE NO. C-6024 
MAHOPAC CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and- " • 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYESS ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, PUTNAM 
COUNTY LOCAL 840 
Intervenor/lncumbent. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
. <• • 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority.vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Fmnlovees Union has 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: All Monitors.-
Excluded: Substitute (per diem) Monitors and all other titles. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and ' 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if . 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: May 2, 2011 
Albany, New York 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 687, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-6034 
TOWN OF MASSENA, 
Employer. , 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, , 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 687 has been designated 
and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
Included: Receiver of Taxes and Assessments, Deputy Receiver of Taxes 
and Assessments, Deputy Town Clerk, Court Clerk and Building 
Maintenance Worker. 
Excluded: Part-time employees, Assessor, Library Director, Library Personnel, 
Highway Superintendent and Secretary/Bookkeeper. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 687. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and.other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a 
written agreement, incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either, party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession. : , ' 
DATED: May 2, 2011 
Albany, New York 
/ " Sheila S. Cole' Member 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-6036 
GATES CHILI CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
_ Employer, 
-and-
GATES CHILI CUSTODIAN, MAINTENANCE AND 
SECURITY ASSOCIATION, 
> Intervenor/lncumbent. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has" been selected,1 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
1
 By letter dated January 18, 2011, the incumbent bargaining agent, Gates Chili 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees Association, Local 
1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Included: All Head Custodians, Custodians, Maintenance Mechanics, 
Groundsmen, Head Groundsmen, Cleaners and Security Workers. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
' . FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall x 
negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees Association, Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an.agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. .
 N 
DATED: May 2, 2011 
Albany, New York /J 
y^C/vf>>^— _ ^ _ _ _ 
Jerome Lefkc^vitz, Ch^jrman 
p u - : u o /•xCi-. I \ / I , . ™ U . , . , 
MAJID ZARINFAR, . 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-30336 
- and -
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL • '•
 r 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK and 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
Respondents. 
MAJID ZARINFAR, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by Majid Zarinfar (Zarinfar) to a 
decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation. (Director) 
dismissing an improper practice charge, as amended, filed by Zarinfar alleging that the 
Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York (District) violated 
§§209-a.1(a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) and 
that the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) violated §§209-a.2(b) and (c) of the Act.1 
Pursuant to §204.2 of the Rules of Procedure (Rules), the Director informed 
Zarinfar that his chargewas deficient on the grounds that: he lacks standing to allege 
violations of §§209-a.1(d) and 209-a.2(b)ofthe Act; the charge fails to allege any facts 
that, if proven, would arguably establish a violation of the Act by the District; and the 
charge fails to clearly and concisely identify specific conduct by UFT that, if proven, 
After Zarinfar amended his charge, the Director dismissed it on the grounds that 
it fails to allege sufficient facts to allege violations of the Act by the District or UFT. 
EXCEPTIONS 
In his exceptions, Zarinfar asserts the Director's decision should be reversed 
because the allegations of his amended charge, along with the documents attached to 
his original pleading, were sufficient to state a claim that his termination by the District 
was discriminatory, arbitrary and in bad faith.2 In addition, Zarinfar claims that the 
Director's dismissal of his amended charge was arbitrary, and based upon a 
misinterpretation of applicable law. Neither the District nor UFT has filed a response to 
the exceptions. 
FACTS. 
In considering Zarinfar's exceptions, we assume the truth of the allegations'in his 
amended charge, granting all reasonable inferences to those alleged facts.3 
Prior to the discontinuance of his teaching license in September 2010, Zarinfar 
taught mathematics and was a-coordinator of the Technology Department at the 
Brooklyn School for Global Studies. In January 2010, a co-worker made disparaging 
remarks regarding his race and ethnicity. When Zarinfar attempted to complain about. 
the comments, the school's interim principal and assistant principal, refused to meet 
2
 Subsequent to filing his exceptions, Zarinfar filed a letter with the Board making new 
allegations against UFT regarding events that took place following the dismissal of his 
charge. Such allegations are not properly before.the Board pursuant to §§204 and 213 
~f „ . . - n , , i ~ „ ~ . ~ , J . . .III „ ~ J . u „ „ „ „ „ : , J , ^ . . ~ , - I 
with him. 
On May 7, 2010, the interim principal discussed with him the possibility that his 
probationary period would be extended for another year due to the fact that a formal 
performance observation had not been conducted. In response, Zarinfar stated that if 
his probation was extended he would file a grievance. Later that month, Zarinfar was 
counseled by the assistant principal with respect to alleged inappropriate comments he 
made to a student. On June 28, 2010, Zarinfar received a satisfactory annual 
probationary report, his third consecutive satisfactory report. 
On September 1, 2010, Zarinfar met with a UFT representative regarding his 
tenure status. Following an examination of District records, the UFT representative 
informed Zarinfar that the District had denied him tenure but that he remained on the 
payroll. The UFT representative provided Zarinfar with documents relating to his status 
The following day, the new principal of the Brooklyn School for Global Studies granted 
Zarinfar permission to attend'a professional development session at another high 
school. However, on September 3, 2010, the principal verbally informed Zarinfar that 
his license had been discontinued and that he should not report to work on September 
7, 2010. During their meeting, the principal, refused to provide Zarinfar with 
documentation regarding his status, and also refused to grant him UFT representation. 
Thereafter, the District replaced Zarinfar with a younger teacher at the school. 
On September 7, 2010, Zarinfar met again with the UFT representative. During 
their meeting, the UFT representative refused Zarinfar's request that he telephone the 
had not received the required written 60-day notice. In addition, the UFT representative 
refused to represent Zarinfar on two unspecified prior occasions. 
DISCUSSION 
To the extent that Zarinfar alleges that District took adverse action against him 
because of his race, national origin and age, or because he reported alleged 
discriminatory remarks by a co-worker, we lack jurisdiction to hear such claims.4 
Pursuant to §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act, our jurisdiction is limited to claims of 
interference and discrimination by an employer with' respect to the rights protected 
under the Act. -
Pursuant to §204.2(a) of the Rules, the Director is required to review all newly 
filed charges to weed out facially deficient claims.5 Under the Rule,- the Director has the 
authority to dismiss a charge on the grounds that it fails to allege facts that, as a matter 
of law, constitute a violation under § 209-a of the Act. 
Following our careful review of Zarinfar's amended charge, we affirm the 
Director's decision because his pleading fails to allege sufficient facts which, if proven, ' 
would demonstrate a violation of the Act by the District or UFT. 
As the Director correctly held, Zarinfar does not have standing to pursue claims 
4
 Claims of employment discrimination and retaliation in the public sector can be 
pursued under various other laws including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
USC §§2000e, etseq, 42 USC §1983, Executive Law §§296 and 297, and the New 
York City Administrative Code, §§8-101, et seq. 
under §§209-a.1(d) and 209-a.2(b.).of the Act,6 and the amended charge does not 
allege any facts to support a claim that the District has dominated or interfered with the 
formation or administration of an employee organization in violation of §209-a.1(b) of 
the Act. 
With respect to his claim under §§209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act, the amended 
charge fails to allege sufficient facts to suggest a causal connection between the 
District's actions and Zarinfar's protected activity. Over a month after Zarinfar allegedly 
told the school's interim principal that he planned to file a grievance if his probationary 
term were extended, Zarinfar received a satisfactory probationary evaluation. Although 
his mathematics license was thereafter discontinued,-the amended charge does not 
allege sufficient facts which, if proven, would create an inference that the District 
representatives who decided to discontinue his license were aware of his threat to 
pursue a grievance. In addition, Zarinfar does not allege that the District had 
knowledge of his meetings with the UFT representative. Finally, Zarinfar's claim that he 
was denied UFT representation during the September 3, 2010 meeting with the 
principal does not state a claim under §209-a.1(a) of the Act.7 
In order to state a claim of a breach of the duty of fair representation in violation 
of §209-a.2(c) of the Act, the amended charge must allege sufficient facts that, if 
6
 Board ofEduc.ofthe City Sch Dist of the City of New York (Jenkins), 38 PERB P012 
(2005). 
7
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proven, would demonstrate that UFT's conduct was arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad 
faith. It is well-settled that an employee organization is entitled to a wide range of 
reasonable discretion in the representation of its unit members.8 The mere allegation 
that the UFT representative refused to comply with Zarinfar's directive to telephone the 
school principal, without additional alleged facts, does not state a claim for a breach of 
the duty of fair representation. Under the Act, an employee organization representative 
may reasonably decline to accede to a unit member's tactical preference. Zarinfar has 
not alleged any facts to suggest that the application of that discretion by the UFT 
representative was arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. Finally, the conclusory 
assertion that UFT's representative declined to represent him previously does not 
strengthen any value to Zarinfar's claim because it fails to meet the specificity 
requirements set forth in §204.1(b)(3) of the Rules. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: May 2, 2011 
Albany, New York 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
In the Matter of 
EUGENIA PINKARD, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-28996 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
Respondent, 
-and-
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Employer. 
EUGENIA PINKARD, pro se 
SCHWARTZ, LICHTEN & BRIGHT, PC (STUART LICHTEN of counsel), for 
Respondent 
DAVID BRODSKY, DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS AN D COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING (SETH J. BLAU of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by Eugenia Pinkard (Pinkard) 
to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dated December 21, 2010, 
dismissing an improper practice charge, as amended, alleging that the United 
Federation of Teachers (UFT) violated §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when an attorney assigned from the New York State United 
Teachers (NYSUT) failed to explain to Pinkard why her employer, the Board of 
a decision following a hearing on her grievance.1 
On January 13, 2011, the Board granted Pinkard's request for an extension of 
time to file exceptions to the ALJ's decision, and she was notified that her exceptions . 
would be considered timely if they were filed and served in accordance with our Rules 
of Procedure (Rules) not later than February 14, 2011. On February 14, 2011, the 
Board received Pinkard's exceptions without proof of service upon UFT and the District 
as required by §213.2 of the Rules. Following a request from the Board, Pinkard 
submitted written proof demonstrating that on February 16, 2011 she served her 
exceptions upon UFT and the District by certified mail, return receipt requested. 
UFT filed a response seeking dismissal of the exceptions on the grounds that 
( ' 
they were untimely served and that they lack merit. The District's response to the 
exceptions seeks dismissal on the same grounds raised by UFT, and one additional 
basis: the exceptions fail to meet the specificity requirements of §213.2(b) of the Rules. 
EXCEPTIONS / 
In her exceptions, Pinkard contends that her statutory rights under Education 
Law §3020-a, and her contractual rights under the District-UFT collectively negotiated 
agreement (agreement), were violated and should be remedied. In addition, the 
exceptions include allegations against UFT that are not part of her improper practice 
charge, and were not determined by the ALJ. 
DISCUSSION 
Pursuant to § 213.2(a) of the Rules, a party filing exceptions must submit proof 
of service to the Board demonstrating that the exceptions were served upon all other 
parties within 15 working days period following receipt of an ALJ's decision. Timely 
service of exceptions upon all other parties is a necessary component for the timely 
filing of exceptions under the Rules, and this timeliness requirement is strictly applied.2 
In the. present case, the Board extended Pinkard's time to serve and file her 
exceptions until February 14, 2011. The documentation submitted by Pinkard to the 
Board, however, demonstrates that she did not serve her exceptions upon UFT and the 
District by certified mail until February 16, 2011. Therefore, her exceptions are untimely, 
and must be denied. 
In the alternative, we would deny Pinkard's exceptions on the merits. Our 
agency has limited jurisdiction, and we do not have authority to determine alleged 
violations of Education Law §3020-a, or alleged violations of the terms of an unexpired 
agreement. There are other venues for such claims, In addition, the filing of 
exceptions is not a proper vehicle for making allegations that are not included in a 
charge that was the subject of the ALJ's decision. 
Finally, Pinkard's exceptions are deficient under §213.2(b) of the Rules because 
they do not specify the grounds for the exceptions, the questions or policy issues she 
wants the Board to consider, the portion of the ALJ's decision she is challenging and 
the sections of the record she relies upon. Although we are mindful that Pinkard is pro 
se, and that her exceptions should be liberally construed, we are unable to discern an 
arguably meritorious basis for her challenge to the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny Pinkard's exceptions and affirm the decision 
oftheALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. , 
DATED: May 2, 2011 
Albany, New York 
" v7. 
//• Jerome Lefkowitf, Chairpje/son 
X' Sheila S. Cole', Member 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF FISHKILL POLICE FRATERNITY, INC., . 
Charging Party, 
CASE NOS. U-27331 
- and - & U-27568 
TOWN OF FISHKILL, 
" Respondent. . 
JOHN M. CROTTY, ESQ., for Charging Party 
DONOGHUE, THOMAS, AUSLANDER & DROHAN, LLP (JUDITH 
CREYLIN MAYLE of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions by the Town of Fishkill Police 
Fraternity, Inc. (PBA) to a decision by an Administration Law Judge (ALJ) that 
dismissed a portion of an improper practice charge filed by PBA alleging that the Town 
of Fishkill (Town) violated §§209-a.1(d) and (e) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it changed the tours of duty and work schedules of PBA 
President Stephen Gallo (Gallo) and PBA Secretary Nicholas DeAntonio (DeAntonio) 
thereby reducing their total weekly hours of work. The ALJ dismissed that portion of the 
PBA charge on the basis that the Town satisfied its duty to negotiate the at-issue 
subject matter.1 
1
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EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, PBA contends that the ALJ mischaracterized its allegations, 
misconstrued certain facts, and erred in sustaining the Town's duty satisfaction defense 
because the parties' expired collectively negotiated agreement (agreement) does not 
address the subject matter of reducing the hours of work of unit employees. PBA also 
asserts that the ALJ should have found that the Town violated §209-a.1 (e) of the Act by 
discontinuing the terms of the agreement. The Town supports the ALJ's decision. 
FACTS 
PBA represents a unit of all part-time Town police officers, including officers 
holding the in-house title of detective. The town began appointing police officers to the 
detective position in 1978. Gallo and DeAntonio are part-time Town detectives. Each 
has a full-time job with other employers: Gallo works as a teacher in New York City and 
DeAntonio works at a power plant. Pursuant to civil service regulations, the hours of 
work for part-time Town employees is limited to 20 hours per week. 
The Town and PBA are parties to a collectively negotiated agreement that 
expired on December 31, 2005. Under the agreement, unit members are compensated 
on an hourly basis pursuant to a negotiated hourly wage schedule. 
Article XVII of the agreement is entitled "Scheduling" and states, in pertinent part: 
The Chief Executive Officer shall schedule or assign 
employees to tours of duty on a monthly scheduling basis 
after obtaining and considering their work hours at their 
primary jobs for the pertinent month of scheduling. . 
However, assignments to tours of duty shall be in the sole 
prior approval OT the Chief, may be subject to disciplinary 
action by the Town Board, and said disciplinary action shall 
be non-grievableand non-reviewable under the terms of this 
Agreement or otherwise. 
* * * * i 
The designation of tours of duty, and the number of officers 
per tour, shall be subject to modification bythe Town within 
its sole discretion and, in consideration thereof, the Town 
shall not create any full-time police officer positions during 
the duration of this Agreement, if the creating of any such 
full-time position results in elimination of any part-time 
position currently held by any actual member of the 
Association's bargaining unit as of the date of this 
Agreement. 
* * * * 
Assignment of employees to non-regular scheduled tours of 
duty during any calendar month, shall be based on seniority, 
within title, on a rotating basis. The list shall flow 
continuously starting with the next senior employee from 
where the last employee accepted the non-regular 
scheduled tour of duty. All employee shall be canvassed. A 
declination shall move the list to the next employee and so 
on. An employee who does not respond to the canvass call 
within ten (10) minutes of that call, shall be deemed a 
declination. 
If an officer scheduled for a regular tour of duty is unable to 
work that tour, due to excused illness, injury, or emergency, 
the Chief Executive Officer or his/her designee may hold 
over the least senior officer working the previous tour, to 
work the vacant tour of duty, so long as (a) the Chief has 
exhausted the call-in procedures without obtaining a 
volunteer, if he/she has had a reasonable opportunity to do 
so, and (b) the hold-over does not conflict with the officer's 
primary employment schedule. Hold-overtime shall be 
compensated at time and one-half (1.5X) of the officer's 
hourly rate of pay.2 
Article XVI of the agreement states: 
Any other terms and conditions of employment currently existing 
in June ZUUD, negotiations between the parties commenced tor a successor 
agreement. One of PBA's negotiation demands, which the Town opposed, proposed 
amending Article XVII to include a minimum numbers of hours of a detective's tour and 
workweek: 
The Detective Sergeant shall be scheduled and work 
three (3) tours of duty Monday, through Friday in a 
minimum of six (6) hour blocks of time, mutually 
agreeable to the Chief of Police or designee, and the 
Detective Sergeant. The three (3) Detectives shall be 
scheduled and work three (3) tours of duty, Monday 
through Saturday, in a minimum of six (6) hour blocks 
of time, mutually agreeable to the Chief of Police or 
designee and the Detective(s).4 
During his testimony, Gallo acknowledged that PBA made this proposal so that "we 
would all have the same hour shifts."5 
Following an impasse in the negotiations, PBA filed a petition for compulsory 
interest arbitration on March 29, 2006, the interest arbitration took place on January 26, 
2007, and an award was issued in January 2008. The interest arbitration panel 
unanimously rejected PBA's proposal to create a minimum number of hours for tours 
and workweeks of detectives.6 ^ 
The Town's patrol division has a daily schedule of four six-hour tours. However, 
there is a different schedule system for detectives. Originally, detective tours were 5 
3
 Charging Party Exhibit 10, p. 10. 
4
 Respondent Exhibit 8, Attachment, p.4, PBA proposal 9. 
Transnrint n 13fi ' 
sunaay. suosequentiy, tne I own created daytime tours to accommodate the 
availability of detectives. 
It is undisputed that detectives are assigned to work different hours, days and 
tours, depending on each detective's availability and the Town's needs. Prior to 
November 27, 2006, the Town created monthly schedules based, in part, on the 
number of hours each detective was available. Detective schedules are subject to 
modification based upon the time demands of the detective's full-time jobs and the 
needs of the Town. -
Generally, Gallo worked 18 hours in three six-hour tours each week. On 
occasion, he worked a total of 20 hours per week if an incident held him over from his 
scheduled tour. DeAntonio, on the other hand, generally worked 20 hours each week 
with a schedule of two seven-hour tours and one. six-hour tour. Due to his full-time job 
responsibilities, however, DeAntonio worked 18 hours a week in April and May 2006, 
with a schedule of two three-hour tours and one 12-hour tour. Effective December 1, 
2005, the Town changed the schedules of Gallo and DeAntonio to a defined weekly v 
'j , 
schedule of four five-hour tours. 
In January 2007, the Town announced a new schedule for detectives. Three 
detectives were assigned to weekly daytime tours totaling 18 hours each with the 
opportunity to work two additional hours per week as flex time. Three other detectives, 
including Gallo and DeAntonio, were assigned tours totaling 15 hours and they were 
allotted five hours of flex time. To be eligible to work flex time hours, a detective has to 
nours "tneyn usually say, okay, go ahead and do it.'" 
DISCUSSION 
We begin with PBA's exception asserting that the ALJ misconstrued its 
allegations by describing the charge as relating to "changes in work schedules" or "tours 
of duty."8 We deny this exception because it is meritless. The express wording of 
PBA's charge alleges that the Town reduced the hours of Gallo and DeAntonio by 
unilaterally changing their tours of duty and their work schedules.9 
We also reject PBA's exceptions regarding the ALJ's description of the number 
of hours worked by Gallo and DeAntonio prior to January 1, 2007. The evidence 
presented by PBA during the hearing concerning the respective length of tours and 
workweeks of each Town detective is incomplete and confusing, at best. This is a by-
product of a negotiated scheduling system that grants the Town discretion to designate 
tours based upon the time commitments of each detective's outside full-time 
employment. Finally, PBA's arguments regarding the ALJ's conclusions regarding the 
varying work hours of Gallo and DeAntonio are irrelevant because the Town satisfied its 
duty to negotiate the subject matter of the charge. 
To establish a duty satisfaction defense, evidence must be presented 
demonstrating that the parties have negotiated an agreement with terms that are 
7
 Transcript, p. 141-4. 
8
 PRA FYrrpntinn 1 
nave negotiated a suDjeci 10 complexion, we appiy stanaara principles OT contract 
interpretation focused on discerning the parties' intent by giving a practical interpretation 
to the language utilized. If the contract language is reasonably clear but susceptible to 
more than one interpretation, we will consider parol evidence in the record to determine 
the parties' intent.11. 
Pursuant to Article XVII of the parties' agreement, the Town has sole discretion 
to designate tours of duty and to schedule or assign a detective to any particular tour of 
duty after considering the detective's work hours in his or her primary full-time job.. A 
change to a detective's tour is also subject to the Town's sole discretion. In addition, 
the Town has contractual authority under Article XVII to create regular and non-regulai\ 
/ _ . . . 
tours of duty. 
The fact that the Town has full contractual authority to unilaterally designate a 
tour of duty, create both regular and non-regular tours, and assign a detective to tours 
based upon his or her work hours in outside employment demonstrates that it is 
reasonably clear that Article XVII grants the Town the authority to unilaterally change 
the number of hours of a detective's weekly tours and thereby unilaterally decrease the 
10
 Niagara Frontier Transit Metro System, Inc, 42 PERB 1J3023 (2009);' NYCTA, 41 
PERB 1J3014 (2008). We reject PBA's contention that the waiver standard applied in 
Onondaga-Madison BOCES, 13 PERB 1J3015 (1980), confirmed sub nom, Board of 
Cooperative Educational Services Sole Supervisory District, Onondaga and Madison 
Counties v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 82 AD 2d 691,14 PERB U7025 (3d Dept 
1981) is applicable to the present case. The earlier decision resolved a waiver 
argumentpremised upon management rights and zipper clauses, which is not the same 
standard for a duty satisfaction defense. See, Town of Shawangunk, 32 PERB ]{3042 
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Nevertheless, Article AVI I may be reasonably interpreted to have more than one 
meaning based upon its reference to regular and non-regular tours, with certain of 
those assignments subject to a seniority roster. Therefore, we consider parol evidence 
in the record to determine whether the Town satisfied its duty to negotiate. 
The parties' bargaining history demonstrates that the Town has satisfied its duty 
to negotiate the subject of reducing the weekly total of hours of detectives. One and. 
one-half years before the at-issue change, PBA placed on the bargaining table a 
proposed modification to Article XVII to eliminate the Town's discretion regarding the 
number of hours worked by detectives. Under the proposal, each detective would work 
a minimum of 18 hours per week over three six-hour tours of duty. PBA unsuccessfully 
pursued this demand through interest arbitration. We conclude that PBA's pursuit of 
this proposal eliminates any ambiguity that Article XVII grants the Town sole discretion 
to reduce or increase the number of hours worked by a particular detective. 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny PBA's exceptions and affirm the decision of 
theALJ. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Town forthwith: 
1. return to the status quo ante with respect to the use of the Town's e-mail 
system by PBA members; 
2. rescind and remove the December 13', 2006 counseling memo from 
Sergeant DiPalma's personnel file; 
3. rescind and delete from Sergeant DiPalma's calendar year 2006 
4. sign ana posi ine anacnea nonce ai an pnysicai ana eiecironic locaiions ai 
which notices to unit employees are customarily posted 
DATED: May 2, 2011 
Albany, New York 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
EMPLOYEES 
: PURSUANT TO. 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE -. 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE . 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES'FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Town of Fishkill in the bargaining unit represented 
by the Town of Fishkill Police Fraternity, Inc. that the Town of Fishkill will forthwith: 
1. return to the status quo ante with respect to the use of the Town's e-mail 
system by PBA members; 
2. rescind and remove the December 13, 2006 counseling memo from 
Sergeant DiPalma's personnel file; 
3. rescind and delete from Sergeant DiPalma's calendar year 2006 
evaluation all less than satisfactory ratings based on the limits on his 
ability to work and all references to the December 13, 2006 counseling 
memo. 
Dated By , . ; . . . . : 
On behalf of the Town of Fishkill 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and 
In the Matter of 
ONTARIO COUNTY SHERIFF'S ROARD PATROL 
UNIT 7850-05, ONTARIO COUNTY LOCAL 835, 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-30353 
COUNTY OF ONTARIO and ONTARIO COUNTY 
SHERIFF, ^ 
Respondent. ^ 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (TIMOTHY CONNICK of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
KRISTEN J. THORSNESS, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by joint employer County of 
Ontario and Ontario County Sheriff (Joint Employer) to an interim ruling of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denying the Joint Employer's prehearing motion to 
dismiss an improper practice charge filed by the Civil Service Employees Association, 
Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) alleging that the Joint Employer violated 
,§§209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
allegedly retaliated against CSEA unit president Matthew Peone (Peo.ne) for engaging 
in protected activity under the Act including presenting CSEA unit member complaints 
t n O n t a r i o P.ni mt\/ ."^hori f f Ph i l in P n \ / p m (Pr\\/c*m\ 
After CSEA filed the charge, the Joint Employer moved for particularization 
pursuant to §204.3(b) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules), which was denied by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Thereafter, the Joint Employer filed an answer to the 
charge. During the prehearing processing of the charge, CSEA submitted a multi-page 
document containing additional allegations in support of its charge. 
On January 10, 2011, a joint verified notice of claim was served upon the Joint 
Employer by Peone and co-worker Brain Raeman (Raeman) in their personal capacity. 
The notice of claim, which was prepared by a private attorney for Peone and Raeman, 
contains 107 paragraphs alleging, inter alia, that each has been the subject of 
retaliation for rebuffing sexual advances by a superior officer within the Ontario County 
Sheriffs Office. Some of the alleged acts of retaliation in the notice of claim are the 
same or similar to the allegations in the charge. 
Four days following service of the notice of claim, the Joint Employer made a 
motion to the ALJ seeking dismissal of CSEA's charge on the grounds that PERB lacks 
jurisdiction to hear the charge and that Peone has waived the right to pursue his claim 
before PERB. In a letter decision dated March 1, 2011, the ALJ denied the Joint 
Employer's motion. Thereafter, the Joint Employer advised the ALJ of its intention to . 
pursue exceptions pursuant to §212.4(h).of the Rules. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The Joint Employer contends that it has a right to file exceptions to the ALJ's 
jurisdiction to hear CSEA's charge based upon the allegations in the notice of claim and 
that the service of the notice constitutes a waiver of the right of Peone and CSEA to 
pursue remedies at PERB. 
CSEA opposes the Joint Employer's effort at obtaining interlocutory review of the 
ALJ's interim decision and supports the ALJ's denial of the Joint Employer's motion.. 
DISCUSSION 
In support of its purported right to file exceptions to the ALJ's decision denying its 
motion, the Joint Employer relies upon the Board's decision in State of New York,^ 
which determined that a motion for leave to file exceptions was unnecessary when a 
party seeks, to challenge an interim decision of an ALJ on an "ultimate issue." In State 
of New York (Division of Parole),2 however, we reversed State of New York3 because it 
was an aberration from well-established Board precedent requiring a party to seek 
permission to file exceptions from interim decisions and rulings pursuant to §212.4(h) of 
the Rules. Therefore, we reject the Joint Employer's argument that it has a right to file 
exceptions to the ALJ's decision 
Although the Joint Employer made a clear tactical decision not to seek leave to 
file exceptions, we will treat its pleading as a motion for leave pursuant to §212.4(h) of 
1
 39 PERB 1J3032 (2006). 
2
 40 PERB 1J3007 (2007). 
Under our case law, a motion for leave to file exceptions will be granted only 
when a party demonstrates extraordinary circumstances.5 The reasoning underlying 
this standard is our recognition that it is far more efficient to await final disposition of the 
merits of a charge before we examine interim determinations, Furthermore, the 
improvident grant of leave will result in unnecessary delays in the processing of 
improper practice charges. 
The Joint Employer asserts that, as a matter of law, service of the notice of claim 
divests PERB of jurisdiction and waives the right of Peone and CSEA to pursue the 
charge. In.addition, the Joint Employer submits an affidavit from Sheriff Provero stating 
that since November 2009, Peone has filed multiple grievances, workplace violence 
complaints, demands for arbitration, improper practice charges as well as baseless 
claims with the United States Department of Justice. Sheriff Provero also asserts that 
"Peone's conduct as road patrol president has significantly undermined the previously 
harmonious relations" between the Joint Employer and the CSEA unit.6 Finally, Sheriff 
Provero contends that it would be prohibitively expensive for the Joint Employer to 
4
 CSEA (Arredondo), 43 PERB 1J3021 (2010); State of New York-United Court System 
(McConnell), 41 PERB 1J3038 (2008). 
5
 Mt Morris Cent Sch Dist, 26 PERB 1J3085 (1993); Greenburgh No 11 Union Free Sch 
Dist, 28 PERB P034 (1995); Town of Shawangunk, 29 PERB P050 (1996); New York 
State Housing Finance Agency, 30 PERB P022 (1997); Council 82, AFSCME (Bruns), 
32 PERB H3040 (1999); Watertown City Sch Dist, 32 PERB P022 (1999); UFT 
(Grassel), 32 PERBfl3071 (1999); City of Newburgh, 33 PERB P031 (2000); State of 
New York (Division of Parole), supra, note 1; UFT (Gray), 41 PERB P025 (2008). 
would have to produce to respond to the charge's allegations. 
Following our review of the Joint Employer's arguments, we conclude that it fails 
to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances warranting the grant of leave to file 
exceptions. Pursuant to §205.5(d) of the Act, PERB has exclusive jurisdiction to 
determine whether an employer has engaged in an improper practice in violation of 
§209-a.1 of the Act.7 The fact that Peone included in the notice of claim an alternative 
motivational theory underlying the alleged retaliation neither deprives PERB of 
jurisdiction to hear the charge, nor does it constitute a waiver of jurisdiction. 
In drafting §205.5(d) of the Act, the Legislature did not include a choice of forum 
provision limiting or denying our jurisdiction to hear an improper practice when a party 
has asserted an arguably inconsistent statutory claim in another forum.8 Based upon 
the plethora of federal and state laws prohibiting discrimination and retaliation in the 
workplace, it is by no means unusual for there to be related ancillary litigation or 
administrative proceedings involving the same set of facts in a charge pending before 
our agency. Although the pursuit of ancillary litigation may not deprive of us of 
jurisdiction or constitute a waiver, the results of such litigation may, in certain 
circumstances, form the basis for a collateral estoppel defense to a charge pending at 
West Genesee Cent Sen Dist, 31 PERB P005 (1998).' 
In contrast, other New York labor statutes prohibiting workplace retaliation and 
While we are appreciative of the cost concerns raised by Sheriff Provero, such 
concerns do not justify depriving a charging party of an evidentiary hearing. 
Nevertheless, the Joint Employer may, if it so chooses, request the ALJ to apply her 
considerable discretion in the conduct of the hearing.10 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny the Joint Employer's motion for leave to file 
exceptions. 
DATED: May 2, 2011 
Albany, New York 
'yi/^irni^<^_ ^^^f^^-^^^i^C^ 
Jerome Lefkawitz, ChaifmrSj? 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
9
 City of Fulton,.31 PERB 1(3021 (1998). -
10
 Board ofEduc of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York (Ruiz) 43 PERB 1J3022 
